Myths are great mobilizers. Defined in stark, Manichaean terms, last week’s conflict in Russia provoked an emotional outcry in the United States. That was good for Bill Clinton, who needs to mobilize public opinion behind the aid package he’ll offer Boris Yeltsin at the end of this week, when the two presidents are scheduled to meet in Vancouver. Other politicians used the crisis to oppose Pentagon budget cuts; as Rep. Daniel Coats put it last week, “A dangerous world still demands a sharpened sword.” But the problem is that myths, while sometimes based on truth, are not actually true. And a foreign policy based on tired cliches risks being overtaken by reality.
Let’s start with the white hats. Boris Yeltsin is indeed a good friend to the West, one who was democratically elected (though he’s not the only democratically elected official in Russia, as some pundits suggest) and who generally supports the kind of economic reform we consider desirable in Russia. But that does not mean that Yeltsin personifies democracy, or that, as Michael Mandelbaum put it in The New Republic recently, “support for democracy in Russia means support for Yeltsin.” Nothing outrages Russian moderates more than the feeling that Yeltsin is the West’s sole hero, while they are being dumped in a category of “opponents of reform.” Yeltsin is our friend, but he shouldn’t be our only one.
In analyzing Russia’s struggle, we can’t simply equate “former Communists” with the black hats. We think former Communists are all hard-liners: anti-democracy, anti-reform, anti-Yeltsin. But Yeltsin himself was a party leader, and so were many of the reformers we’ve supported in Russia. In the old days “Communist” described not so much an ideology as a degree of interest in public affairs. Anyone who cares enough about public affairs to read this article, for example, would probably have been a Communist in the old Soviet system. Meanwhile, the right-wing nationalist who genuinely would be a threat to the West, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, likes to brag that he never joined the Communist Party.
Parliament fights Yeltsin partly because that’s a good way to get ahead in politics. After all, Yeltsin himself made a career out of opposing President Gorbachev. George Will noted approvingly in The Washington Post last week that “the old guard is old.” But once this generation passes, it’s sure to be replaced by a new old guard, the usual collection of unimaginative mediocrities who are sitting in Russian parliaments at all levels of government. They, too, will make their careers out of fighting Yeltsin.
As fractious, irresponsible and hostile as the Parliament might be, Yeltsin has to learn to live with it. His aides have begged him to work with the legislators, to massage them: invite them to the Kremlin, make them feel like big shots. Yeltsin hasn’t done it. His crisis with them does not have to be as serious as it is. While some of the tensions may be ideological-the battle of good versus evil that many Americans seem to see-a large part of the problem is ordinary political ineptitude.
Yeltsin needs to rid himself of the idea that enemies must be bypassed, as he tried to do with the announcement of “special rule.” Getting rid of obstructionist foes has long been Yeltsin’s tactic: he swept away Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. He was certainly justified: those were relics of a bygone era, and they blocked further reform. But state authority in Russia has grown dangerously weak. Yeltsin should not deprive Russia of one more pillar of government.
Weak government is the real enemy in Russia. A weak government pursuing radically pro-Western policies may be counterproductive in the long run, since its failures may discredit the West generally. But a strong government following a moderately pro-Western line could enhance global stability and serve our interests better. That doesn’t mean we should dump Yeltsin. But it does mean that we have to learn to live with the black hats.
The mythic version of Russian politics, with Boris Yeltsin writ large, captures the public imagination, but it doesn’t prepare the public for the gritty, complex struggles still ahead. Wait until hyperinflation digs in, factories start laying off workers and Boris Yeltsin’s rivals finally supplant him, as they inevitably will one day. We’ll need our subtlest sensors. And there’ll be a rainbow of different hats.
