Operation Restore Hope is more a generous impulse than a thought-out policy. It sets a new standard for military intervention: that a vast human tragedy is reason enough to impose peace on a country. That sounds like an oxymoron-the humanitarian use of force; stop the violence or we’ll kill you-but so far, Americans support it. In a NEWSWEEK Poll, 66 percent of the people surveyed endorsed Bush’s plan, even though 77 percent of them thought U.S. troops were likely to get shot at. With the cold war over, missions of mercy provide a worthwhile use for America’s military muscle. But the rules for compassionate intervention have not been spelled out with enough clarity. What precisely is the objective in Somalia? When will it be time to leave? If outsiders can interfere in Somalia, where else can they, or must they, act? Should the world intervene only in nations like Somalia, where peacemaking is relatively easy? Or is there also a moral obligation to use force in horror-struck countries like Bosnia, where intervention would be bloodier and success far less certain?

The endgame for Operation Restore Hope may have to be devised by the man from Hope, Ark. Last week Bill Clinton commended Bush for the Somali operation. Clinton’s advisers think Somalia is a manageable problem, but they worry about setting precedents-and being forced into snake pits like Bosnia. Striving to create a “new world order,” Bush has left his successor a half-formed policy of high-minded interventionism. Now Clinton, who began his political career protesting U.S. involvement in Vietnam, will have to refine the philosophy and spell out the rules for a concept that is suddenly gaining acceptance: the right to interfere.

This mission begins when 1,800 Marines debark from a flotilla that arrived off the coast of Somalia last week. The Marines will take control of Mogadishu’s harbor and airport, beginning a thrust into the interior (chart, page 32). Reinforcements will include 16,000 more Marines from the First Expeditionary Force in California, and about 10,000 soldiers, mostly from the Army’s 10th Mountain Division at Fort Drum, N.Y. NEWSWEEK has learned that Green Berets and psy-war teams will be sent in for special operations. With other personnel, including National Guardsmen and reservists, the U.S. commander on the ground, Lt. Gen. Robert Johnston, will have about 28,000 troops on hand, for starters. A few thousand more will be provided by other countries. The multinational force will face little organized resistance at first; the major warlords have promised to cooperate. But thieves and freelance gunmen may take potshots at the peacemakers. And sooner or later, Johnston’s forces may have to antagonize some or all of the warlords if they want to pacify the country for keeps.

Bush considered moving into Somalia months ago, but with the election campaign underway, he knew that any such action would be seen as a political gimmick. Once the election was lost, he was inclined to leave Somalia to his successor; Bush said despondently that he was “referring all calls” to Clinton. But too many people were dying to wait until Jan. 20. The decision to act sooner, made two weeks after the election, reinvigorated Bush, giving him one last chance to establish his legacy as a president who created a new role in the world for his country. By last week he was immersed in the Somali issue, arriving at the Oval Office just after dawn to debate the risks and working the phones to drum up support from other world leaders. Said a senior aide: “It’s great to have him back.”

The new rules for intervention still seem to include acting under U.N. cover. Washington was not about to cede command of the operation to anyone else. But in order to get a unanimous vote on the 15-member Security Council, the Americans accepted the appearance of U.N. control. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was given a vague oversight role, but Americans will decide how to carry out their mission, and when to end it. They won’t even wear the United Nations’ blue headgear.

Somalia’s warlords responded with a classic stratagem: if you can’t beat ’em, join em. “The mission of the U.S. is to save the Somali people, and I welcome it,” said Ali Mahdi Mohamed, a powerful warlord who controls part of Mogadishu. “This is a time for peace and reconciliation among Somalis,” said his main rival, Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid. Both men offered to help the Americans, but it was unlikely that Aidid, for one, would willingly give up any of his power. Ordinary Somalis had high expectations for the U.S. intervention-perhaps too high. “The most important thing is to [confiscate] arms and make a new government,” said Suma Higiga, 70, as she herded her nine cows through the abandoned U.S. Embassy compound. The multinational force probably will not complete either task. Nor will it remain on the job as long as many Somalis want. “We believe the Americans should stay in Somalia as long as we need them,” said Aidid. “I think a minimum of one year.”

If the Americans stay anywhere near that long, their mission will have failed. The Pentagon’s rules for humanitarian intervention are brutally simple: go in hard and get out quickly. Though the rules of engagement for U.S. forces are supposed to be secret, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney came close to spelling them out at a press conference last week. He said the troops will be “authorized to take whatever steps they feel are necessary to defend themselves and their charges, including, if necessary, taking pre-emptive action to forestall hostile actions aimed at them. We will do everything we can to reduce the risk to our people,” Cheney said.

The force’s acknowledged task is to get the relief operation back on track. Pentagon sources say its unacknowledged assignment is to break the grip of the warlords and tilt the political balance of power back toward the more peaceable tribal elders. Those jobs require substantial disarmament of Somali society, which emerged from the cold war (and periods of patronage by both superpowers) armed to the teeth. Some weapons might be purchased; others will have to be taken away.

The Americans hope to start pulling some of their troops out of Somalia by Jan. 20. But the memory of other rescue missions haunts Pentagon planners. U.S. troops are still in Saudi Arabia nearly two years after the end of the Persian Gulf War. Americans are becoming more heavily involved in enforcing the embargo against Serbia and protecting relief shipments to Bosnia. U.S. planes still patrol over most of Iraq, protecting rebellious Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north. A relief mission to the Kurds was supposed to be taken over by the United Nations long ago, but hasn’t been. If there is no political settlement in Somalia, U.S. troops could be stuck there as well. Getting out is usually harder than getting in.

Some progress toward political accommodation was made last week at a U.N.sponsored conference in Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian capital. It was attended by Somali tribal elders, intellectuals and relief officials and representatives of nine political organizations (not including Aidid’s). They agreed to support intervention under U.N. auspices and called for a cease-fire. The political groups even chose a single spokesman, Gen. Mohamed Abshir Musse. “Let’s be realistic,” he said. “Somalia was destroyed by Somalis, and we need help.”

Washington hopes to encourage the dialogue. Diplomat Robert Oakley, a former ambassador to Somalia, was called out of retirement to serve as a political adviser to the military command. “We have to develop the support of the population and [build] some sort of foundation,” he said in Addis Ababa. “Otherwise we risk leaving a very nasty situation behind.” When U.S. ground forces pull out, there will still be Americans at risk. Many of the relief workers are U.S. citizens. And Powell said some military units would stay behind to run logistics and transportation.

As Operation Restore Hope shaped up, new rules for humanitarian intervention were beginning to emerge, often haphazardly. Among them:

Resolution 794 determined that “the magnitude of the human tragedy” in Somalia “constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” Ambassador Richard Gardner, a professor of international law at Columbia University, says this concept “makes international lawyers’ hair stand on end.” He adds: “In the early days of the U.N., [Somalia’s tragedy] would have been regarded as an internal matter. That’s why the United Nations stood by while [Uganda’s] Idi Amin slaughtered his citizens and Saddam Hussein gassed the Kurds.” Once the precedent has been set in Somalia, it’s hard to see how missions of mercy can be avoided in other large-scale threats to life. But one coldblooded question is unresolved: how many dead and dying are enough to require intervention?

Someone has to be in charge of each military intervention, and often that will have to be the world’s most powerful country. “The U.S. military is the single most capable mechanism for quickly moving lots of people and supplies,” says Ed Luck, president of the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. And as Bush pointed out, “American action is often necessary as a catalyst for broader involvement of the world community.”

Americans can’t take charge of policing every beat. Currently, troops from seven West African nations are struggling to stop the civil war in Liberia. In Cambodia, fellow Asians are trying to keep the peace, including Japanese troops serving overseas for the first time since World War II. And perhaps European nations should do more to stop “ethnic cleansing” in Bosnia.

Cheney said last week that Somalia is “militarily doable.” He added: “If we had 200,000 troops in Bosnia today, I’m not sure what I’d tell them to do.” If the United States gets bogged down in just one blood-soaked quagmire, other, more realistic rescue missions might be called off. And if the international community tries too many operations at once, all of them may fail for lack of adequate support. Humanitarian intervention requires a clear, quickly attainable goal. Americans will find out in the next few months whether Operation Restore Hope conforms to that basic rule.

The mission is humanitarian, but in order to work, it will have to be executed with the forethought and precision of a full-scale military invasion. Soldiers will open up supply lines and get food to the needy, while keeping an eye out for nervous warlords and heavily armed teenagers, high on drugs.

Marines use helicopters to secure airfields and set up bases in Mogadishu and Baidoa. Amphibious vehicles drive into the city from the south and help landing craft take the port and nearby warehouses. Bulldozers, tents and water-purification systems from three prepositioning ships are moved onto shore. Aircraft carrier Ranger, with two escort vessels, pulls up off the coast. Duration: about a week.

While 16,000 Marines land in Mogadishu, 10,000 army troops fly into Baidoa, then fan out to take Oddur, Belet Huen and Jalalaxi. Meanwhile, engineers repair roads, medics treat the sick and transport units open up supply lines. By early January, 28,000 troops are in place.

The operation moves south into the port of Kismayu and the Bardera airfield. Troops may also move into the north country. Bit by bit, U.S. troops begin to hand over territory to U.N. forces, commencing the fourth and final phase of the operation.

1,800 Marines aboard three amphibious vessels off Somalia will be joined by 16,000 troops and airmen from Camp Pendleton and El Toro air base in California.

Force will consist of 8,000 troops from the 10th Mountain Division from Fort Drum, N.Y., and 2,000 support troops, many of them guard and reserve, from around the U.S. Units will include a small special-forces contingent, mainly to conduct psy-ops against warlords.

600 ground personnel will coordinate operations for the several thousand airmen who will fly the transport and tanker fleets that will bring in the troops.

C-141 planes will carry troops from the U.S., but only two airstrips can accommodate them. C-130 planes and CH-53 helicopters are the workhorses, flying supplies to bases and feeding centers.

Trucks, light armored vehicles and Humvees will do the work on the ground.

If the AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters don’t scare the warlords into submission, the USS Ranger aircraft carrier parked offshore probably will.

Unglamorous trucks and the humble bulldozer will be major players as troops build roads and establish bases.

Four major bandit leaders exercise loose control over most of the famine-plagued region. Clan ties and shaky coalitions are what keep them in power.

Most powerful warlord; belongs to Hawiye clan; controls much of famine zone through fragile alliances; has amassed forces to retake Bardera.

Aidid’s archrival, was once his ally in fight to oust Siad Barre; belongs to Hawiye clan.

Allied with Aidid despite being a member of the Darod clan; control over key port of Kismayu is tenuous.

Recently wrested control of Bardera from Aidid; son-in-law of former dictator Siad Barre and member of the Darod clan; allegedly backed by Kenya.

MAP: Somalia

Does the United States have a greater responsibility than other countries to keep peace around the world and ensure humanitarian relief, or only the same responsibility as other countries? 56% Same responsibility 42% Greater responsibility For this NEWSWEEK Poll, The Gallup Organization interviewed a national sample of 602 adults Dec. 3-4. Margin of error +/- 5 percentage points. “Don’t know” and other response, not shown. The NEWSWEEK Poll copyright 1992 by NEWSWEEK, Inc.